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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2017  
TAGS: [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [NATO](#) [PREL](#) [PINS](#) [AF](#) [DA](#)  
SUBJECT: DENMARK: NEXT STEPS ON AFGHANISTAN

REF: STATE 13871

Classified By: Ambassador James Cain, reasons 1.4b,d

¶1. (C) Ambassador Cain highlighted for Danish Defense Minister Soren Gade the urgency of new contributions for Afghanistan and NATO-ISAF, emphasizing our common interest in ensuring that the requirements identified by SACEUR are met as quickly as possible. Gade indicated general support for our approach and appreciation for the high stakes in Afghanistan, but offered no indication of new Danish commitments in advance of the Seville ministerial.

¶2. (C) Our subsequent approaches with Danish MFA and Defense Ministry officials confirmed that the Danish government is weighing additional contributions, beyond the augmented reconstruction and Afghan army training assistance announced at the January 26 ministerial, but that no decisions have yet been made. MFA Deputy Director for Security Policy Soren Bollerup suggested that the Danish military is stretched thin with its overseas deployments and that there is little chance of coming up with significant numbers of additional troops for Afghanistan, unless eventual reductions in Iraq could free up forces for ISAF. Both Bollerup and Deputy Defense Minister for Policy Kristian Fischer reported that consideration is being given to a number of possible contributions, including provision of additional special forces, F-16 air support, and participation in PRTs in Nimroz or Dai Kundi, but cautioned that these proposals are still at the review stage. In the case of special forces, the Danish officials noted that they would probably not be deployed until later this year in any case, given their training schedule.

¶3. (C) Danish officials evinced strong support for our message and pledged to help work with NATO allies to meet the designated shortfalls. With forces deployed in some of the most challenging spots in Afghanistan, the Danes recognize that NATO must prevail there, and are keen to see all members of the Alliance do their part.

CAIN